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Comments
Corporate Negligence: Defining the Duty Owed by
Hospitals to Their Patients
The question of whether or not a hospital may be liable to a
patient for the negligence of its employees, agents, and staff physi-
cians is an area of the law which has undergone much change in
recent years. Among the several theories which would justify liabil-
ity, corporate negligence has been termed an "emerging trend."'
With the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision in
Thompson v Nason Hospital,2 Pennsylvania has become one of the
states which now recognize that liability may result from the
breach of a duty which is owed by the hospital directly to the
patient.'
In light of the Thompson decision, it is likely that practitioners
in Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania courts will necessarily be
faced with questions as to the applicability of the doctrine of cor-
porate negligence to particular sets of circumstances and as to the
breadth of the doctrine itself. This comment will address the
Thompson decision, the rationale for the doctrine of corporate
negligence and the potential extent of liability that is likely to be
recognized in Pennsylvania. It will be further suggested that an ap-
plication of the tools of the emerging field of law and economics
1. Thompson v Nason Hospital, 527 Pa 330, 591 A2d 703, 707 (1991). Corporate
negligence is often also referred to as corporate liability or hospital liability. It has been
defined as meaning "the hospital is liable if it fails to uphold the proper standard of care
owed to its patient." Thompson, 591 A2d at 707.
2. 527 Pa 330, 591 A2d 703, 707 (1991).
3. Thompson, 591 A2d at 703. This is not to suggest that Thompson created a new
duty. Rather, Thompson recognized that a hospital may be held liable for a breach of that
duty. The Thompson court noted that a duty owed by the hospital to its patient was recog-
nized in Pennsylvania at least since the court's prior decision in Riddle Memorial Hospital
v Dohan, 504 Pa 571, 475 A2d 1314 (1984) (holding that a hospital's duty of care is properly
set forth in Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). However, prior to
Thompson, there was little reason to scrutinize the scope of the hospital's duty to its
patient.
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may be helpful in determining when a particular injury should be




Traditionally, the courts of Pennsylvania applied the charitable
immunity doctrine to shield hospitals from liability to their pa-
tients.8 However, in 1965, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reeval-
uated and abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity.' In abol-
ishing the doctrine of charitable immunity, the court found that
the liability of a hospital was to be governed by the same princi-
ples which apply to every other employer.' However, it was not
until fifteen years later that the courts of this state adopted Sec-
tion 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which recognized
that a hospital could be held liable on the theory of ostensible
agency.8 Ostensible agency allows a patient to recover from the
hospital for the negligence of a physician, regardless of the physi-
cian's actual employment status, if the patient looks to the hospi-
tal rather than the physician for care and the hospital holds the
physician out as its employee."
However, in light of the changing nature of the modern hospital,
other states began to go beyond the principles embodied in the
theory of ostensible agency and began to recognize that a hospital
has a distinct duty of care which it owes directly to the patient. 0 It
was within this context that the doctrine of corporate negligence
was adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Thompson."
4. The author suggests this analysis as a tool which can be useful in analyzing
whether a particular duty has been implicated and whether that duty has been breached.
Recognizing that an economic analysis will often be limited by the availability of relevant
information, the author does not suggest that it is always desirable to base liability solely
upon an economic analysis.
5. See, for example, Michael v Hahnemann Medical College, 404 Pa 424, 172 A2d
769 (1961). Charitable immunity is the rule under which "an eleemosynary institution is not
liable for the torts of its agents and employees." Michael, 172 A2d at 770.
6. See Flagiello v Pennsylvania Hospital, 417 Pa 486, 208 A2d 193 (1965).
7. Flagiello, 208 A2d at 208.
8. Capan v Divine Providence Hospital, 287 Pa Super 364, 430 A2d 647 (1980). See
also Simmons v St. Clair Memorial Hospital, 332 Pa Super 444, 481 A2d 870 (1984).
9. Capan, 430 A2d at 649.
10. See, for example, Darling v Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill 2d
326, 211 NE2d 253 (1965).




The origin of the doctrine of corporate negligence is frequently
attributed to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Darling v
Charleston Memorial Hospital.12 In Darling, a plaintiff who broke
his leg while playing in a college football game was awarded
$150,000 by a jury after his leg was amputated due to the negli-
gence of the attending doctor.' 3 On appeal, the defendant argued
to the Illinois Supreme Court that the trial court should not have
allowed the jury to consider evidence of the state licensing com-
mission's regulations, the accreditation board's regulations and the
hospital's own bylaws in determining the duty which was owed to
the patient by the hospital.14 In rejecting this argument, Justice
Schaeffer reasoned that the "community standard," which defend-
ant advanced, embodied a notion that the hospital does not under-
take to treat its patient. 5 The court then stated that the limited
view of a hospital's duty no longer reflected fact.' 6 "Present day
hospitals, as their manner of operation demonstrates do far more
than furnish facilities for treatment."'
7
Since the Darling decision, a number of other states have also
adopted some version of the corporate negligence doctrine.', In fol-
lowing those cases which recognize an independent duty owed di-
rectly to the patient, Pennsylvania adopted a broad approach to
corporate negligence in Thompson.
In Thompson, Mrs. Thompson had been transported by ambu-
lance to Nason Hospital after she was involved in an automobile
accident.'" She was subsequently admitted to Nason Hospital due
to head and leg injuries.20 While hospitalized, her situation deterio-
12. 33 Ill 2d 326, 211 NE2d 253 (1965).
13. Darling, 211 NE2d at 255.
14. Id at 256-57.
15. Id at 257.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Insinga v LaBella, 14 Fla 214, 543 S2d 209, 213 (1989). In Insinga, the question
of whether the doctrine of corporate negligence should be recognized was heard by the Flor-
ida Supreme Court on a certified question from the United Statescourt of appeals. At that
time, the court identified Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Texas, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin as having recognized some form of corporate negligence with regard
to hospitals. Insinga, 543 S2d at 213. Since that time, Florida (in Insinga), Pennsylvania (in
Thompson) and Alabama (In Coleman v Bessemer-Carraway Medical Center, 589 S2d 703
(Ala 1991)) have also recognized corporate liability.




rated and she eventually became partially paralyzed.21 She was
subsequently transferred to Hershey Medical Center where a cere-
bral hematoma was diagnosed.22 The Thompsons' complaint al-
leged that her condition was the result of the negligence of Nason
Hospital as well as the negligence of her treating physician at
Nason Hospital. They specifically alleged that the defendants were
negligent in failing to adequately examine and treat her, in failing
to follow hospital rules with regard to consultations and in failing
to monitor her condition.23
The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor
of the hospital and the Thompsons appealed. On appeal, the supe-
rior court considered two questions.24 It determined that material
issues of fact existed as to (1) whether Dr. Schulz, Mrs. Thomp-
son's treating physician, was an ostensible agent of the hospital,
and (2) whether the hospital was itself negligent in the treatment
of Mrs. Thompson.25 In so doing, the court recognized that corpo-
rate negligence could be the basis of a cause of action against a
hospital.26 The trial court was therefore reversed.2 1 The hospital
sought and was granted allocatur by the Pennsylvania Supreme
'Court to examine the question of whether corporate negligence
should be found to exist in Pennsylvania.28
After tracing the history of the status of hospitals under tort law
and the policies underlying corporate negligence, the court con-
cluded that the superior court was correct in recognizing a cause of
action for negligence directly against a hospital. Justice Zappala's
majority opinion discussed the general scope of the duty owed by a
hospital to its patients. According to Justice Zappala's opinion,
there are four general areas in which the hospital has a duty to-
ward the patient. They are:
(1) a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate
facilities and equipment... (2) a duty to select and retain only competent
physicians . . . (3) a duty to oversee all persons who practice medicine
within its walls . . . and (4) a duty- to formulate, adopt and enforce ade-
21. Id at 705.
22. Id.
23. Id. Mrs. Thompson and her husband were both named as plaintiffs in the action.
Id at 703.
24. See Thompson v Nason Hospital, 370 Pa Super 115, 535 A2d 1177 (1987).
25. Thompson, 535 A2d at 1177.
26. Id at 1181.
27. Id at 1182.
28. Allocatur was granted in 518 Pa 642, 542 A2d 1370 (1988).
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quate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the patients. 29
Justice Zappala further noted that these duties are not delegable.30
There are two noteworthy qualifications which the Thompson
court set forth. First, "it is necessary to show that the hospital had
actual or constructive knowledge of the defect or procedures which
created the harm." 31 Second, "the hospital's negligence must have
been a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to the injured
party. 3 2 Despite this broad statement of the applicability of the
general rule, the question remains as to exactly what the rule's
boundaries are. Insight into the doctrine's boundaries may be
gained by considering its underlying rationales and justifications.
A. Policy Rationale
The primary justification which is proffered for corporate negli-
gence is the changing role of the hospital within society. 3 Hospi-
tals regularly employ large staffs of doctors, nurses and others.
They also contract with outside entities and individuals to provide
services to patients. Most hospitals also grant staff privileges to a
number of physicians who are neither independent contractors nor
employees.
As early as the Darling decision, it has been recognized that "the
person who avails himself of 'hospital facilities' expects that the
hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other em-
ployees will act on their own responsibility. 3 4 Thus, corporate
negligence serves the purpose of enforcing the legitimate expecta-
tions of members of the public.
In addition to recognizing that individuals frequently look to the
hospitals to provide treatment, corporate negligence assigns tort li-
ability in accordance with actual practice. Modern hospitals nor-
mally operate as businesses accepting fees for services, thereby
eliminating the rationale that patients, as the objects of charity,
should not recover from charitable trusts.35 Essentially, this rea-
29. Thompson, 591 A2d at 707.
30. Id.
31. Id at 708.
32. Id.
33. Early hospitals often offered a limited number of services and normally served
only the poor. Wealthier individuals were most often treated in their homes where they
received better care. For a discussion of the role of early charitable hospitals, see Flagiello,
208 A2d at 196.
34. Darling, 211 NE2d at 257.
35. Thompson, 535 A2d at 1181.
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son, which initially justified immunity in favor of hospitals, has
ceased to exist.3 6 This was implicitly recognized by the Thompson
court. Justice Zappala explained that:
Hospitals have evolved into highly sophisticated corporations operating pri-
marily on a fee-for-service basis. The corporate hospital of today has as-
sumed the role of a comprehensive health center with responsibility for ar-
ranging and coordinating the total health care of its patients.
3 7
B. Economic Justification
In addition to the traditional policy rationales for corporate lia-
bility discussed above, there exists an economic justification. Be-
cause it is potentially difficult to define the outer limits of the ap-
propriate application of a rule of corporate liability under the
traditional policy approach, the economic justification for a rule of
corporate liability merits discussion.
An economic analysis of the law seeks to determine whether a
given rule of law encourages behavior which will maximize societal
well being. If a particular rule is conducive to maximizing societal
well being, it is said to be efficient.3 8 Virtually all decisions made
within a hospital are arrived at through the use of some type of
cost benefit analysis.3 9 However, when a decision is reached with-
36. Thus, corporate liability is a reactionary rule which subjects hospitals to tort lia-
bility in accordance with generally applicable principles of tort law which have already been
readily applied to similarly situated potential tortfeasors.
37. Thompson, 591 A2d at 706. In a number of states, including Pennsylvania, the
nature of the progression to recognition of corporate liability can be readily noted as the
decisions recognizing this basis of liability usually build upon cases which have already rec-
ognized the policy basis of corporate liability. For example, in Pennsylvania, Thompson
traces the history of hospital liability in Pennsylvania. See id at 706-07. In so doing it cites
Capan, 430 A2d at 647. In recognizing liability on the basis of ostensible agency, the Capan
court stated, "Present day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do
far more than furnish facilities for treatment .. " Id at 649. The Thompson court also
specifically recognized that the Commonwealth's courts had previously adopted Section 323
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in Riddle Memorial Hospital v Dohan, 504 Pa 571,
475 A2d 1314 (1984). Similarly, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, in Bost v Riley, 44
NC App 638, 262 SE2d 391 (1980), in explicitly recognizing corporately liability for the first
time in that state, observed that, "While the doctrine of corporate negligence has never
previously been either expressly adopted or rejected by the courts of our State, it has been
implicitly accepted and applied in a number of decisions. The Supreme Court has intimated
that a hospital may have the duty to . . . ." Bost, 262 SE2d at 396. Practitioners in states
not yet recognizing corporate liability may thus be well-advised to utilize such an approach
before their respective courts.
38. See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 11 (Scott, Foreman
and Co., 1988). Conversely, where a rule of law does not lead to maximum societal well
being, it is said to be inefficient.
39. For example, when a hospital is faced with a number of vacancies on its staff,
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out fully considering all of the costs and benefits that a decision
involves, an inefficiency may result.40 Thus, an economic analysis
can be useful here in determining whether a rule of corporate lia-
bility will create circumstances conducive to efficient decision-
making by health care providers.
By utilizing an economic analysis, it can be demonstrated that a
rule of corporate liability will lead to efficient levels of precaution
by health care providers if liability is assigned to hospitals when
(1) the hospital alone is in a position to reduce the expected cost of
malpractice,4 or (2) the hospital is in a position to reduce the ex-
pected cost of malpractice by acting in conjunction with
physicians.42
Each time a patient is admitted to the hospital, the patient will
be required to pay certain fees, some of which will eventually be
allocated to the doctor and some of which will be allocated to the
hospital.43 These fees can be represented in the following manner:
f = the portion of the fees paid by the patient which are
located to the hospital
-- the portion of the fees allocated to the doctor
d- fh + fd
From these fees, various expenses will be deducted to arrive at
the net benefit each party will derive from the transaction. They
should it allow hospital capacity go unutilized, admit a number of young inexperienced phy-
sicians to its staff, or increase the workload of existing staff members? When a patient is
likely to remain partially paralyzed if not treated, should a risky or novel procedure be
performed? When should a second dodtor be consulted before making a decision?
40. Thus, using the first example from note 39, it is appropriate that, in determining
whether to hire a number of inexperienced doctors, the hospital take into consideration both
the benefits of treating a larger number of patients as well as the costs. One such cost of
hiring an inexperienced doctor may be an increased probability that the doctor will commit
malpractice. Thus, where B represents the benefit derived from hiring inexperienced doc-
tors, P represents the probability of malpractice and L represents the cost a patient will be
forced to endure if malpractice occurs, from a social standpoint it is desirable to only hire
the quantity of inexperienced doctors such that B > P*L. See United States v Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F2d 169 (2d Cir 1947).
41. It is assumed for the purposes of this comment that the expected cost of malprac-
tice is reflected by the amount of damages which would be expected to be awarded upon a
finding of negligence (hereinafter "E(m)").
42. A corollary to this is of course that corporate liability does not enhance efficiency
when the hospital cannot reduce the expected cost of malpractice by acting either alone or
in conjunction with a physician. A hospital is only incapable of engaging in efficient precau-
tion where it can neither take a precaution itself nor negotiate with the physician to take
additional precautions. Such a situation would occur where the hospital cannot foresee a
harm which would occur from the doctor's failure to take a precaution.
43. For the purposes of this comment, it does not matter whether various fees are
billed separately.
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can be represented as:
-N the hospital's net benefit from the transaction
Nd the doctor's net benefit from the transaction
N= Nh + Nd"
As rational decision-makers, both the doctor and the hospital
will seek to yield the maximum possible net benefit from the trans-
action.45 In order to do so, they will also take into account the ex-
pected cost of malpractice which they will be required to bear and
the cost of preventing malpractice. These items can be represented
as follows:
E(m)h = the expected value of the hospital's liability to the
patient for malpractice.
E(m)d = the expected value of the doctor's liability to the
,patient for malpractice.
E(m)j = E(m)h + E(m)d
Ph = the cost of precaution against malpractice to the
hospital.
Pd = the cost of precaution against malpractice to the doctor.
Pj = Ph + Pd
46
Thus, Nd = fd - (Pd + E(m)d).4 7 Similarly, Nh = fh - (Ph +
E(m)h) and N- = f. - (p- + E(m)j). Under a rule of immunity in
favor of the hospital, E(m)h will be equal to 0 and E(m)j will be
equal to E(m)d.
From this it can be seen that where pj < E(m)j and Pd > E(m)d,
an immunity rule will fail to create an incentive to avoid injury to
the patient even though it would be efficient to take additional
precaution against the injury.48 This inefficient outcome may occur
44. Such fees would include the costs of supplies, etc. For the purposes of this com-
ment, however, it will be assumed that the only costs incurred by the hospital are the costs
of precaution against malpractice and the expected value of malpractice liability.
45. This concept is correctly termed profit maximization.
46. Further note that the respective values of E(m)h, E(m)d, and E(m)j will not ex-
ceed the ability of the doctor, the hospital or both to pay a judgment. Also, where both the
doctor and the hospital may be held liable as joint tortfeasors, E(m)h will equal E(m)j -
E(m)d and E(m)d will equal E(m)j - E(m)h (since they are jointly liable).
Under Pennsylvania law, each physician must carry liability insurance in the amount of
$100,000 per occurrence to an aggregate of $300,000, and each hospital must carry $100,000
of liability insurance to a maximum of $1,0000,000. In addition, a contingency fund was
created by statute to cover the next $1,0000,000 in liability. Health Care Services Malprac-
tice Act, 40 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1301.701 (1990 Supp).
47. Note the relationship between p & E(m). As p increases, E(m) should decrease.
Similarly, as p decreases, E(m) should increase. See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics
at 348 (cited in note 38).
48. There are actually two scenarios which could occur under these circumstances. (1)
If fd > E(m)d, the procedure involved will be carried out with a resulting incidence of in-
Vol. 30:639
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either because of a differential between the actual cost of injury
discounted by the probability of nonoccurrence (E(m)) and E(m)d
or because of a differential between Pd and pj.
Where E(m)> E(m)d the physician, as a profit maximizer, will
have an incentive to invest in precautionary activity only to the
extent that precautionary activity will reduce E(m)d. Under such
circumstances, where it is possible to reduce E(m) by an amount
less than E(m) - E(m)d, an inefficient outcome may result since
the doctor will have no (legal or economic) incentive to increase
precautionary activity.49 A rule of corporate negligence can thus in-
crease efficiency to the extent that p- is less than E(m)j by encour-
aging precautionary activity which would not otherwise be taken.50
Where as a result of the differential between Pd and pj an ineffi-
ciency could occur under an immunity rule, the inefficiency can be
avoided under a rule of corporate negligence.5 1 If either an other-
wise efficient precaution could best be implemented only by the
hospital, or where precaution could only be best implemented
through joint action, a rule of corporate negligence will create a
potential efficiency gain.52  Hence, corporate negligence should be
found except when the doctor is the least cost avoider and the hos-
pital cannot efficiently create incentives for the doctor to take ad-
ditional precautions.5 3
jury. This may occur where either the resulting injury discounted by the probability of non-
occurrence is in fact less than the physician's fee or the physician perceives that he would be
found non-negligent (thereby rendering E(m)d = 0). (2) If fd < E(m)d, the procedure may
not be performed.
49. In economic terms, since there is no incentive for a physician to reduce E(m)
unless E(m)d is also reduced, the physician will externalize the cost of injury, at least in
part. See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 45 (cited in note 38). A rule of corporate
liability is designed to force the hospital, a joint tortfeasor, to accept responsibility for that
portion of those losses which it could have efficiently prevented. In light of the foregoing,
the dissent's position in Thompson (that corporate liability is an unnecessary deep pockets
approach) becomes unconvincing. See Thompson, 591 A2d at 709 (Flaherty dissenting).
50. Note, however, that inefficiency may still result where E(m)> E(m)j.
51. Put another way, a rule of immunity is inefficient when either the hospital is the
least cost avoider or the parties acting jointly are the least cost avoider.
52. This final corollary reflects the fact that the hospital and doctor can transfer a
portion of fi amongst themselves such that the least cost avoider assumes the burden of
engaging in precautionary activity. Although such bargaining is theoretically possible under
an immunity rule, the incentive to do so is unilateral. Because the incentive is unilateral,
such bargaining would be expected only if E(m)d is greater than Ph. This leaves a number of
instances in which there is an insufficient motivation for a physician to initiate bargaining.
53. For a general discussion of the role of law and economics in the area of agency
law, see Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability under the Law of Agency, 91
Yale L J 168 (1981). For an economic discussion of the actual impact of varying liability
rules in medical malpractice cases, see Patricia Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of
Duquesne Law Review
III. APPLICATION
As previously observed, the doctrine of corporate negligence, as
adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is potentially very
broad. A discussion of the underlying duty may be most useful by
analyzing authority from Pennsylvania as well as other
jurisdictions.
A. Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care in the Procurement and
Maintenance of Equipment
A basic duty which a hospital has is to exercise reasonable care
in the procurement and maintenance of equipment.54 Application
of this aspect of corporate negligence may be illustrated by refer-
ence to the facts of Hamil v Bashline.55 In Hamil, Mrs. Hamil
transported her husband, who was suffering from chest pains, to a
hospital which was staffed by members of the Bashline Hospital
Association.56 Because the physician assigned to the emergency
room could not be located, Mr. Bashline was treated by a Dr. J. F.
Johnston. Dr. Johnston ordered an EKG to be taken.57 When the
machine failed to operate due to a faulty electrical outlet, he di-
rected that another machine be used.58 He left the hospital there-
after. 9 Because a second EKG machine could not be found, Mrs.
Bashline took her husband to the private office of a Dr. Saloom
where he died while an EKG was being performed. 0
Under these facts, there are at least two possible bases for appli-
cation of the corporate negligence doctrine to the maintenance of
equipment. First, assuming that the hospital had constructive no-
tice that the electrical outlet was faulty, it could be argued that the
hospital failed to exercise reasonable care in allowing an electrical
Medical Malpractice Claims, 27 J L & Econ 115 (Apr 1984).
54. This, however, does not mean that a hospital would necessarily be held strictly
liable for defective equipment. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has in fact previously in-
terpreted Section 402A as inapplicable to a hospital. Podrat v Codman-Shurtleff Inc., 384
Pa Super 404, 558 A2d 895, allocatur denied, 524 Pa 609, 569 A2d 1368 (1989). See also
Grubb v Albert Einstein Medical Center, 255 Pa Super 381, 387 A2d 480 (1978).
55. 481 Pa 256, 392 A2d 1280 (1978). Because the hospital was not named as a de-
fendant, the issue of the hospital's liability was not at issue. Hamil, 392 A2d at 1280. The
facts are nonetheless appropriate to illustrate how corporate liability could become an issue
when equipment is not properly maintained.







outlet in an area used to treat patients under exigent circum-
stances to remain in a defective condition. Second, there exists a
question as to whether it was reasonable to have only one EKG
machine available. Assuming that this could not be found reasona-
ble, the hospital could be held negligent for failing to adequately
procure and maintain equipment.
A second illustration of when liability may result from defective
equipment is the case of Emory University v Porter."' In Emory, a
baby received burns as a result of an unshielded light bulb on an
incubator.2 The parents filed an action against the hospital in
which the burn occurred. However, because the parents had not
alleged that the incubator was defective or that the hospital should
have known of the danger posed by the incubator, the parents did
not prevail.6 3 Had the parents alleged that the hospital knew or
should have known of the defective and/or dangerous condition of
the incubator, it is likely that the hospital would have been found
liable on the basis of corporate negligence.6 4
B. Duty to Exercise Care in Granting, Renewing and Extending
Staff Privileges
One of the most basic decisions which a hospital must make is
whether to grant, renew or extend staff privileges to a particular
physician. The doctrine of corporate negligence itself is a recogni-
tion that patients have an expectation that the hospital will only
admit physicians who are qualified to its staff.
65
61. 103 Ga App 752, 120 SE2d 668 (1961).
62. Emory University, 120 SE2d at 669.
63. Id.
64. See J. Douglas Peters, Eleven Theories of Direct Liability, 24 Trial 82, 85 (Nov
1988). Peters argues that liability may not be premised solely upon the equipment's age
(which is what the plaintiff did in Emory University). He argues that a hospital will be held
liable only if the equipment is defective and the hospital fails to act to correct the danger
posed by the equipment. Peters, 24 Trial at 85 (cited within this note).
65. Arguably, even when there exists a relationship between the patient and the phy-
sician, the existence of a particular doctor's staff privileges at a particular hospital (or hospi-
tals) will have frequently been an important factor in the patient's initial decision to treat
with a particular physician.
It does not necessarily follow that a hospital would always be liable when a physician
commits a tort off of the hospital's premises. Where a physician commits an act of malprac-
tice off of the premises, there are several barriers which may preclude recovery. First, there
exists a problem of proving that a doctor's affiliation with a given hospital did in fact influ-
ence the patient's choice of doctors. In a case in which the tort occurs on hospital premises,
a patient can more readily demonstrate the relevance of a doctor's staff privileges to the
decision to utilize a specific physician for the treatment involved in the act of malpractice.
The question is one of proximate causation. Second, the injury which occurs on hospital
1992 649
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While the facts of the Thompson case itself did not involve the
question of whether the hospital was negligent in granting, re-
newing or extending staff privileges, this issue has previously
arisen on a number of occasions in other jurisdictions.
In Insinga v LaBella,66 the plaintiff was treated at Florida's
Humana Hospital for several months by a Dr. LaBella6 According
to the opening statement of counsel for the plaintiff, the plaintiff's
decedent would have had a ninety percent chance of survival had
Dr. LaBella properly diagnosed and treated the patient. 8 The
plaintiff also indicated that Dr. LaBella was not a doctor at all but
was a criminal who had fraudulently obtained a medical license
using the name of a dead Italian physician and that the defendant
hospital was negligent in not properly verifying Dr. LaBella's ap-
plication for staff privileges. 9 A verdict was directed by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in favor
of the defendant hospital.7 ° The question was subsequently certi-
fied to the Florida Supreme Court by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.7 1 The Florida Supreme Court
concluded that a hospital may be held liable for a breach of its
duty owed directly to the patient based upon the hospital's negli-
gent decision to grant staff privileges.
72
Of particular note is the fact that the Florida Supreme Court
identified the policy behind this specific duty. It stated that, as a
matter of public policy, "hospitals are in the best position to pro-
premises is distinguishable from one which occurs off hospital premises because, in the for-
mer case, the tort involves the actual exercise of staff privileges. Third is the question of
whether the hospital's duty to exercise reasonable care in granting staff privileges extends to
non-patients. A case in which it was held that a hospital was not liable for the conduct of a
physician which occurred outside hospital premises is Pedroza v Bryant, 101 Wash 2d 226,
677 P2d 166 (1984). There, the Washington Supreme Court held that the doctrine of corpo-
rate negligence was cognizable in Washington but that a patient who was injured by an act
of malpractice which occurred off of hospital premises had not stated a cause of action. The
court reasoned that corporate negligence is a duty which a hospital owes only to its patients.
Pedroza, 677 P2d at 172.
66. 14 Fla 214, 543 S2d 209 (Fla 1989).
67. Insinga, 543 S2d at 210. Plaintiffs were unable to actually serve LaBella with
process. Dr. LaBella had been extradited to Canada prior to when the complaint was to
have been served. The extradition occurred because he was under indictment in Canada for
the manufacture and sale of illegal drugs. Id.
68. Id at 210.
69. Id.
70. Id. The verdict was directed before the close of the plaintiff's evidence. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id at 211-12. Section 768.60 of the Florida Statutes imposes a statutory duty
upon hospitals. However, because the injury occurred prior to the statute's effective date,
the case was decided as a matter of common law. Torts, 21 Fla Stat § 768.60 (1986).
650 Vol. 30:639
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tect their patients and, consequently have an independent duty to
select and retain only competent independent physicians seeking
staff privileges."8
In Johnson v Misericordia Community Hospital,74 the plaintiff
suffered paralysis of his right thigh muscle after a nerve and artery
were damaged during surgery to remove a pin fragment from the
plaintiff's hip.7 5 The record reflected that the operation in question
was performed by a Dr. Salinsky at Milwaukee's Misericordia Hos-
pital.76 Salinsky had been licensed to practice medicine and had
been recommended by members of Misericordia's medical staff.
77
However, the record also clearly demonstrated that his application
had not been investigated and that several representations con-
tained on his application were false. Specifically, Salinsky had rep-
resented that he had not been previously denied staff privileges
nor had his privileges been reduced.78 Contrary to Salinsky's repre-
sentations, he initially had privileges to perform simple orthopedic
procedures at one hospital, but his status at that hospital was later
changed to curtesy staff after a request for additional orthopedic
privileges was denied.79 Another hospital suspended his privilege to
perform any hip procedures after it received a report of Salinsky's
"continued flagrant bad practices."80 The record also reflected that
Salinsky was neither board-certified nor board-eligible in orthope-
dic surgery and that, at the time of the approval of his appoint-
ment, seven malpractice suits were pending against him.3
On the basis of the record before it, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld the judgment which had been entered against the
hospital."2 In upholding the judgment, the court relied upon the
theory of corporate negligence. In the court's opinion, Justice Cof-
fey discussed the duty which a hospital must meet in selecting
73. Insinga, 543 S2d at 214. This is, of course, a least cost avoider approach.
74. 99 Wis 2d 708, 301 NW2d 156 (1981).
75. Johnson, 301 NW2d at 158.
76. Id.
77. Id at 159.
78. Id.
79. Id at 161.
80. Id at 161-62.
81. Id at 162.
82. Id at 175. Prior to trial, the plaintiff had settled with Salinsky. Id at 158. A jury
trial was held in which Misericordia Hospital was the defendant. After the trial, a judgment
was entered against the hospital in the amount of $333,429.39 based upon the jury's finding
that the hospital was 80% negligent and that Salinsky was 20% negligent. Id at 163. The




members of its staff. After recognizing that one of the hospital's
primary functions is to screen members of its staff, the court
stated that, "We do not adopt the legal theory that knowledge of
incompetency is the standard for determining whether a hospital
exercised due care in selecting its staff." 3 Rather, the court held
that the plaintiff was only required to show that the hospital failed
to exercise reasonable care to determine whether Salinsky was
qualified to receive orthopedic privileges.8 4 The court found that
the hospital was chargeable, at a minimum, with having knowledge
of information which could have been readily obtained had it veri-
fied the information contained in Salinsky's application.85
A hospital may also be held liable for the failure to withdraw
staff privileges when it has received notice of the misconduct of a
staff physician. In Copithorne v Framingham Union Hospital,86 a
material issue of fact was held to exist where a plaintiff alleged
that she was drugged and raped by her physician. The Massachu-
setts court held that if the facts alleged by the plaintiff were
proven true, they could form the basis of a jury's verdict against
the hospital since the plaintiff had claimed that the defendant hos-
pital had actual notice of allegations that the physician had sexu-
ally assaulted patients.8 7
C. Duty to Monitor and Review Patient's Treatment and
Progress
Closely related to the duty to exercise care in granting and re-
newing staff privileges is a duty to monitor and review a patient's
progress and treatment. The Thompson decision makes it clear
that a modern hospital acts as a patient's health care coordinator
and that a patient is entitled to expect that the hospital is ulti-
mately going to cure the patient. In accordance with this senti-
ment, Justice Zappala stated that when a physician fails to act
properly, the hospital and its employees have a responsibility to
take appropriate action. "If the attending physician fails to act af-
ter being informed of such abnormalities, it is then incumbent
upon the hospital staff member or employee to so advise the hospi-
83. Id at 171.
84. Id. Reasonable care was defined as "that degree of care ordinarily exercised by
the average hospital." Id.
85. Id at 172.
86. 401 Mass 860, 520 NE2d 139 (1988).
87. Copithorne, 520 NE2d at 143.
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tal authorities so that appropriate action may be taken. '88 Beyond
the general articulation of the duty to monitor and review a pa-
tient's treatment and progress, this requirement has been further
analyzed in other jurisdictions.
In Fridena v Evans,89 because of a serious injury that the plain-
tiff, Sharon Evans, sustained to her leg, Dr. Fridena performed an
operation on the plaintiff.90 During the operation Dr. Fridena in-
serted a pin into Evans' leg and hip. 1 After the operation, one of
the plaintiff's legs was one and one-half inches shorter than the
other.92 Six months later, a second operation was performed to cor-
rect the plaintiff's condition.9 3 As a result of the second operation,
the plaintiff's leg became a total of three inches shorter than the
other.94 Thereafter, Evans filed an action naming as defendants Dr.
Fridena, another doctor who assisted in the operation and Physi-
cians and Surgeons Hospital. 5 After a verdict was entered in favor
of the plaintiff, the hospital appealed, arguing that Dr. Fridena
was an independent contractor and that the hospital could not be
held vicariously liable. 8 The appellant's argument was rejected by
the Arizona Supreme Court, which held that the hospital could be
held liable on a theory of corporate negligence.9 7
Specifically at issue in Fridena was the plaintiff's contention
that, in allowing Dr. Fridena to perform a second operation, the
hospital breached its duty to allow use of its facilities only by "pro-
fessionally competent physicians who treat their patients with ac-
cepted medical procedures."98 In holding that the trial court's de-
nial of a directed verdict in favor of the hospital was not error, the
Arizona Supreme Court stated that the hospital had notice of the
88. Thompson, 591 A2d at 709.
89. 127 Ariz 516, 622 P2d 463 (1981).
90. Fridena, 622 P2d at 464.
91. Id.
92. Id. The plaintiff's complaint did not allege that the first operation was negligently
performed. Id.
93. Id. The second operation was also performed by Dr. Fridena. The procedure in-
volved bisecting the femur and inserting a bone graft. Id at 464-65.
94. Id at 465.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id at 466.
98. Id at 465. The plaintiff's expert witness testified at trial that "the decision and
recommendation to do the type of surgical procedure involved fell below the standard of
care." Id at 467. The defendant's appeal also raised the issue of whether there existed a
second school of thought, which was applicable to Dr. Fridena so as to render plaintiff's
expert's testimony inadmissible (in that the expert's testimony was not with regard to the
applicable school). This argument was rejected. Id.
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procedure employed by Dr. Fridena and was therefore potentially
liable.9 Fridena is significant in that the decision was not based on
either the hospital's grant of staff privileges to the doctor or the
hospital's failure to withdraw his privileges. Rather, the issue was
solely whether the hospital was negligent as a result of permitting
Dr. Fridena to perform a specific procedure upon a specific pa-
tient.100 In recognizing corporate negligence, Justice Holohan
stated that the trend is "to hold the hospital responsible where the
hospital has failed to monitor and review medical services being
provided within its walls." 101 Thus, the hospital's duty includes an
obligation to take reasonable steps to monitor and review the
treatment being received by a patient.
Poor Sisters of St. Francis v Catron'0 takes an even broader
approach to liability based upon a hospital's failure to adequately
act upon abnormalities in the care received by a patient. In Ca-
tron, the plaintiff experienced trouble breathing and was unable to
speak above a whisper as a result of the negligence of the hospital
and the patient's doctor in permitting an endotracheal tube to re-
main in the patient's throat for five days.'0 3 Evidence presented at
trial established that the patient's nurses and inhalation therapist
were aware of the deviation from normal practice but did not draw
it to the attention of either the treating physician or their superi-
ors. 0 4 The hospital presented to the trial court a motion for judg-
ment on the evidence, arguing that the decision to treat a patient
is a medical question for which it could not be held liable. 05 The
trial court denied the motion and was affirmed on appeal. 0 6
In affirming the trial court, Judge Shields noted that a hospital
cannot generally be held liable for the actions of its agents in fol-
lowing a physician's orders, but "an exception to this rule exists
when the nurse or other hospital employee knows the doctor's or-
99. Id at 466. In this case, Dr. Fridena, while not acting as a servant of the hospital in
performing the operation, had knowledge of the procedure in several other capacities (which




102. 435 NE2d 305 (Ind App 1982).
103. Catron, 435 NE2d at 306. Evidence which was presented at trial indicated that an
endotracheal tube should be removed within three to four days after it has been inserted. Id
at 308.
104. Id.
105. Id at 307.
106. Id at 308.
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ders are not in accordance with normal medical practice.' 10 7 Thus,
in the case before it, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate
that the hospital was negligent because the patient failed to receive
care in accord with standard medical practice and that the hospi-
tal's employees failed to report or question the deficiency in the
patient's care. 08
D. Duty to Formulate and Enforce Rules, Policies and
Procedures
The final area in which the Thompson court suggested the exis-
tence of a duty is in the formulation of rules, policies and proce-
dures. Because the hospital serves as the patient's health care coor-
dinator, receives payment for the use of its services and facilities
and is in a position to promulgate policies which can minimize the
risk of harm resulting from procedural deficiencies, this area of
hospital liability is proper. Two areas in which a hospital can effec-
tively act include the promulgation and enforcement of policies re-
quiring the procurement of informed consent and/or consultations
where appropriate.
In Karibjanian v Thomas Jefferson Hospital,'9 Mrs. Karibijian,
acting as the executrix of her husband's estate, filed suit against
Thomas Jefferson Hospital after her husband died as the result of
the injection of a contrast medium during a cerebral arteriograph
performed in that hospital." 0 The wife's complaint alleged, in part,
that the hospital had not obtained her husband's informed consent
before it injected the contrast medium."' The hospital made a mo-
tion to dismiss those portions of the complaint which alleged that
the hospital was negligent in failing to procure the patient's in-
formed consent." 2 The district court, in an opinion by Judge Lord,
overruled the motion to dismiss. Applying Pennsylvania law, Judge
Lord noted that, "Any touching of a patient by a physician is tech-
nically a battery unless it is done with the patient's knowing con-
sent."1 3 Judge Lord then looked to Pennsylvania law and deter-
mined that a hospital owes a duty to its patient to' exercise
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 717 F Supp 1081 (E D Pa 1989).
110. Karibijian, 717 F Supp at 1082-83.
111. Id at 1083.
112. Id.
113. Id at 1084.
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reasonable care in supervising those who work under its roof.1 4 He
then concluded that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for
which relief could be granted as to the averments based upon the
doctrine of informed consent.
115
Judge Lord's approach to the question of corporate negligence
appears to be correct. Under Pennsylvania law, a battery occurs
when a patient is touched by a physician unless informed consent
has been given."' However, it is not a battery which the institution
has committed. 117 Rather, by allowing its facilities to be used in
order to commit a battery, the hospital has been negligent." 8 As
the Thompson court has clearly established, the hospital holds a
special relationship vis-a-vis its patients. Thus, when hospital pol-
icy does not require informed consent to be obtained prior to per-
formance of a procedure, it has clearly violated a duty owed to its
patients." 9
114. Id. Karibijian was decided after the superior court decision in Thompson but
before the supreme court decision.
115. Id. The court also decided the issue of whether the doctrine of informed consent
is applicable to the administration of a drug or contrast medium. Judge Lord concluded that
when the issue is the method of administration rather than the substance injected, the pa-
tient must give informed consent before the substance is injected. In so holding, Judge Lord
distinguished Boyer v Smith, 345 Pa Super 66, 497 A2d 646 (1985). In Boyer, the superior
court held that, since Pennsylvania bases its doctrine of informed consent upon a battery
theory, a physician has no duty to obtain informed consent before proscribing an oral medi-
cation. It also stated, in dicta, that the doctrine of informed consent only applied to cases
involving surgical or operative procedures. In rejecting the Boyer dicta, Judge Lord applied
a battery analysis and concluded that the Boyer court went beyond the facts before it and
ignored the middle ground situation where a touching occurs, but is something less than a
surgery. See also Gray v Grunnagle, 423 Pa 144, 223 A2d 663 (1966); Cooper v Roberts, 220
Pa Super 260, 286 A2d 647 (1971) ("The same duty of disclosure obtains whether or not the
treatment can be technically termed as operative").
116. Karibjanian, 717 F Supp at 1084.
117. Judge Lord, however, did not specifically state whether or not he considered the
hospital to be guilty of negligence or an intentional tort. In a footnote, he stated that for the
purpose of a rule 12(b)(6) (of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) motion, it was unimpor-
tant which theory would justify liability. Id at 1084 n 3.
118. Specifically, the hospital has violated both the third and fourth duties enunciated
by the Thompson court. See note 29 and accompanying text. This is also consistent with the
recognition of the hospital's role as the patient's health care coordinator. See note 37 and
accompanying text.
119. See note 29 and accompanying text. As the hospital's duty encompasses a respon-
sibility to "oversee all persons . . ." and to "enforce adequate rules and policies," the hospi-
tal cannot escape liability merely by having a policy. See Thompson, 591 A2d at 707. The
hospital is clearly obligated to make reasonable efforts to enforce its policies. Enforcement
of an informed consent procedure is not necessarily difficult. At a minimum, each doctor
should be required to place on file documentation that informed consent has been secured.
However, it would seem that the most practical method for a hospital to protect itself would
be to require the presence of a member of the hospital's staff when consent is secured. An
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The duty of the hospital to exercise reasonable care in coordi-
nating the patient's care 20 readily encompasses a responsibility to
take measures to assure that a patient's primary physician will
procure all necessary consultations. According to the plaintiffs'
complaint in Thompson, Mrs. Thompson's paralysis was attributa-
ble at least in part to the hospital's negligence in ignoring its own
rules and regulations with regard to consultations.' 2 ' Because the
issue of consultation was raised in Thompson, it may be concluded
that the court would be likely to hold that consultations are within
the scope of a hospital's duties.
122
The consultation question is one which has been specifically con-
sidered in the corporate negligence context on a variety of occa-
sions by courts in the United States. In Sewell v United States,123
an action was instituted pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act "'24 after the plaintiff allegedly received inadequate care at a
Veterans Administration hospital'2 5 (hereinafter the Veterans Ad-
ministration will be referred to as "the VA"). Carl Sewell had
sought treatment at and was admitted to the VA Medical Center
in Shreveport, Louisiana with a staph infection. 2 6 He was later
discharged. Mr. Sewell subsequently returned to the VA hospital
additional issue which would arise is whether a hospital could be held liable when the pa-
tient is given inadequate information. The issue would hinge upon whether the hospital
made a bona fide or reasonable attempt to secure the patient's consent.
120. See note 37 and accompanying text.
121. Thompson, 591 A2d at 705. Apparently, Mrs. Thompson's death may have been
hastened by the failure of the attending physicians to consult Mrs. Thompson's cardiologist
relative to the use of anti-colugulants. The complaint alleged that Mr. Thompson had ad-
vised Nason Hospital's emergency room personnel of his wife's heart condition. Id.
122. However, the Thompson decision cannot be read as specifically recognizing that
liability can be based upon the hospital's failure to adhere to its policies with regard to
consultations. The Thompson court's discussion of the facts reveals that:
The complaint alleged inter alia that Mrs. Thompson's injuries were the direct and
proximate result of the negligence of Nason Hospital ...in failing to adequately
examine and treat her, in failing to follow its rules relative to consultations, and in
failing to monitor her condition during treatment.
Id. However, after concluding that a hospital owes a duty of care directly to its patients, the
court merely concluded that there existed a sufficient issue of material fact without passing
on which specific averments of the complaint presented an issue of material fact. See id at
709. Nonetheless, given the facts of Thompson and the broad categories of duty enunciated,
it is certainly reasonable to infer that, if the court is later called upon to determine whether
the general duty announced encompasses a duty to procure consultations, the court's answer
will be in the affirmative.
123. 629 F Supp 448 (W D La 1986).
124. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 2671 et seq (1988).
125. Sewell, 629 F Supp at 448.
126. Id at 451-54. More specifically, the patient's infection was "bacteremia," also
known as "septicemia." A blood culture tested positive for staphylococcus aureus. Id at 452.
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where he was attended to by a resident who did not conduct a
physical examination but increased the dosage of one medication
and administered a shot.127 Mr. Sewell was not readmitted.'" Mr.
Sewell's wife's testimony indicated that at the time of his return to
the VA hospital, the plaintiff had a "red lump the size of a goose
egg.' 1 29 Mr. Sewell's condition eventually resulted in the develop-
ment of an abscess and paraplegia. 130
In concluding that the hospital was liable to Sewell, the district
court applied Louisiana law.'"' The court found that the failure to
consult a specialist in infectious disease was below the appropriate
standard of care. The court further found that if a specialist had
been consulted, a different or additional treatment would have
been administered which would have been more beneficial.13 2
The possible application of liability based upon a failure to ob-
tain a consultation can be further illustrated by Ingram v Little
Co. of Mary Hospital.'33 In Ingram, a patient commenced an ac-
tion against her physician and the hospital to which she had been
admitted after a course of treatment subsequent to a miscarriage
failed and injury resulted.' The complaint included an averment
that the hospital willfully and wantonly failed to call in another
physician after her physician's course of treatment failed but
before the complained-of harm occurred.' 35 On appeal, the Illinois
appellate court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the
above noted averment. Justice McNamara, citing Darling, stated
that a hospital may be liable for both its agent's misconduct as
well as a violation of its duty to review and supervise medical
127. Id at 454.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id at 451.
131. Id at 455.
132. Id at 458. Pennsylvania law, while similar, would require an inquiry as to whether
the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in increasing the risk of harm to the
patient as set forth in Hamil, 392 A2d at 1280. In Hamil, a jury verdict was entered in favor
of the defendant hospital after the jury was charged that it could not find that the defend-
ant's conduct was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's death unless the plaintiff would
have died without treatment. Id at 1289. Based upon the jury instruction, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial. It held that once expert testimony is intro-
duced which establishes that the defendant's acts or omissions have increased the risk of
harm to the patient, it is for the fact finder to determine whether such acts or omissions
were a substantial factor in bringing about an injury. Id.
133. 108 Ill App 3d 456, 438 NE2d 1194 (1982).
134. Ingram, 438 NE2d at 1195-96.
135. Id at 1196. Under Illinois law, willful and wanton conduct need not be inten-




It should also be recognized that liability may be found regard-
less of whether the situation involves a physician who does not ob-
tain a consultation from a specialist or a non-physician member of
the institution's staff who fails to obtain a physician's services for a
patient. In Polischeck v United States, 37 the plaintiff's wife ar-
rived at a Naval Regional Medical Center (hereinafter "the
NRMC") suffering from a variety of symptoms suggestive of
subarachnoid hemorrhage.13 The decedent was examined by a
physician's assistant who failed to properly diagnose the etiology of
her problem. s'9 The decedent was then released from the hospi-
tal.140 The decedent was not examined by a physician prior to her
release nor was her chart reviewed by a physician.' 4' Three days
later the decedent became unconscious and was returned to the
NRMC.142 The NRMC eventually transferred her to the University
of Pennsylvania where she died after undergoing an operation. 4
3
Expert testimony revealed that had the decedent initially been
properly diagnosed, she would have had a 75% chance of recov-
ery.14 4 At trial, the plaintiff also introduced testimony that the
symptoms should have at least suggested to a physician the possi-
bility of the decedent's true illness. 145 The plaintiff, however, did
not introduce evidence that the physician's assistant failed to con-
form to the standard of care applicable to physician's assistants
when he failed to render a correct diagnosis. 46
Based upon the evidence adduced at a non-jury trial, the district
court found that the NRMC was negligent. In arriving at his deci-
sion, Judge Bechtle noted, "The Pennsylvania courts, however, ap-
parently have yet to articulate in a published decision the standard
136. Id.
137. 535 F Supp 1261 (E D Pa 1982).
138. Polischeck, 535 F Supp at 1269.
139. Id at 1263-64.
140. Id at 1264.
141. Id. The plaintiff later returned a second time to the hospital along with the dece-
dent. At that time the decedent was initially examined by the same physician's assistant
who then referred her to an unlicensed physician on the hospital's staff. That physician also
failed to properly diagnose the patient's condition. Id. However, the district court's decision
rested solely upon the negligence surrounding the plaintiff's first examination. Id at 1269 n
2.
142. Id at 1265. This was the third time that the decedent was seen at the NRMC.
143. Id.
144. Id at 1269.
145. Id.
146. Id. Whether or not to consult a physician under the NRMC'S policies was en-
tirely within the physician's assistant's discretion. Id.
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of care governing hospitals in the development of policies for the
care and treatment of their patients."'4 7 Judge Bechtle then noted
that those jurisdictions which had considered the question had
held the hospital to either a standard of reasonableness or a com-
munity standard. 14 It was then concluded that the NRMC could
be found liable under either theory.
149
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the above cases concerning a hospital's duty to its
patient, it is apparent that when a patient fails to receive adequate
care, the failure of which the hospital could have prevented
through the exercise of reasonable care, a hospital may be liable to
the patient for resulting injury.
Recognition of the doctrine of corporate negligence, as it applies
to hospitals, reflects a realization of the role of the modern hospital
in society. The doctrine requires that a hospital fulfill its role as a
patient's health care coordinator by the exercise of reasonable care.
As the hospital receives fees for services and is often in a position
to protect its patients from suffering unnecessary harm, the doc-
trine is entirely appropriate. 50
Mark E. Milsop
147. Id at 1270.
148. Id, citing Kastler v Iowa Methodist Hospital, 193 NW2d 98 (Iowa 1971).
149. Polischeck, 535 F Supp at 1270. It is worth noting that one way in which an issue
similar to that in Polischeck may arise is in regard to a health maintenance organization
(HMO). HMOs frequently make significant use of medical paraprofessionals. While the
courts of Pennsylvania are yet to determine whether the doctrine of corporate negligence
applies to an HMO, the superior court in Boyd v Albert Einstein Medical Center, 377 Pa
Super 609, 547 A2d 1229 (1988), held that an HMO may be liable for the tortious conduct of
its ostensible agents. In so holding, Judge Olszewski relied upon the court's earlier decisions
in Capan, 430 A2d 647 (1980), and Simmons, 481 A2d 870 (1984) (see note 8), which recog-
nized the ostensible agency theory as it relates to a hospital. There is little reason to expect
that the result would be any different with regard to corporate liability. Indeed, an HMO
conducts business upon the premise that managed health plans can provide a more cost
effective method of providing health insurance than traditional insurers. Given this price-
conscious approach to health care, a court would be hard pressed to justify a decision not to
force such an organization to fully internalize its costs.
150. By applying this analysis, hospitals will be potentially liable for a variety of inju-
ries for which it would not have previously been held liable. This result, however, means
nothing more than that hospitals must take reasonable precautions in delivering care to its
patients. If the hospital fails, corporate liability assures that the patient will be justly com-
pensated for his or her loss. Such is what the public has the right to expect from a modern
hospital.
